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Conception of Citizenship
The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment establishes
citizenship as a birthright for all children born in the United States, so long as
they are "subject to the jurisdiction thereof." In recent years, as intense
disagreement over U.S. immigration policy has grown, so too has academic
and popular debate over the scope of this "subject to the jurisdiction"
exception. In particular, a number of revisionist scholars have challenged the
orthodox, "territorial" view that birth within the United States alone is
sufficient to create citizenship except in certain extremely rare and narrow
circumstances.1 They argue that in addition to territorial birth, "subject to the
jurisdiction" requires a mutual consensual relationship between individuals
and the U.S. political community; children of undocumented immigrants,
lacling such a relationship, are thus putatively precluded from constitutional
birthright citizenship. This position has underlain conservative grassroots
activism and multiple bills aimed at narrowing birthright citizenship by
statute.
The debate, however, has overlooked a significant piece of historical
evidence. The Amendment's Citizenship Clause draws heavily on the text of a
similar citizenship provision in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, written by Senator
Lyman Trumbull. In a letter to President Andrew Johnson summarizing the
draft Act, Trumbull said that birthright citizenship depended on whether the
1. See PETER H. SCHUCK & ROGERS M. SMITH, CITIZENSHIP WITHOUT CONSENT: ILLEGAL
ALIENS IN THE AMERICAN POLITY (1985); see also, e.g., John C. Eastman, Politics and the Court:
Did the Supreme Court Really Move Left Because of Embarrassment Over Bush v. Gore?, 94
GEO. L.J. 1475, 1484 (20o6); William Ty Mayton, Birthright Citizenship and the Civic
Minimum, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 221 (2008); Charles Wood, Losing Control of America's
Future-The Census, Birthright Citizenship, and Illegal Aliens, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 465
(1999).
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parents of children born in the United States were living permanently,
"domiciled," here. Revisionist consensualist scholars have frequently cited
Trumbull's public statements as significant evidence in favor of their
interpretation of the Citizenship Clause. Yet this previously unanalyzed letter
shows that consensualist reliance on Senator Trumbull in fact runs contrary to
his actual position on citizenship.
My analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the evidence that
Senator Trumbull saw domicile as a determinant of birthright citizenship and
explains the doctrine of domicile as it then existed. Part II lays out the consent-
based interpretation of citizenship. Part III demonstrates how domicile is
consistent with a modified territorial interpretation of the Citizenship Clause,
rather than the consensualist view discussed in Part II.
I. "DOMICILE" AND ITS MEANING
The Fourteenth Amendment states that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized
in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the state wherein they reside."2 Congress intended this
text, similar in form to the citizenship clause of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,3 to
entrench the effect of that provision.4 Congress drafted and passed the Act over
President Johnson's veto while the House of Representatives was considering
the Amendment; scholars frequently study the Act's citizenship language as a
guide to that of the Amendment.'
While the Act was before Congress, Senator Lyman Trumbull, who wrote
its citizenship language 6 and managed the Act in the Senate, wrote a letter to
President Andrew Johnson summarizing the bill.7 The letter begins: "The Bill
declares 'all persons' born of parents domiciled in the United States, except
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 ("[A]ll persons born in the United States and
not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be
citizens of the United States.").
4. See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 1st Sess. 2896 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard).
5. E.g., SCHUCK& SMITH, supra note 1, at 74-81.
6. See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9th Cong., ist Sess. 498 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
7. Letter from Sen. Lyman Trumbull, Chairman, Senate Judiciary Comm., to President
Andrew Johnson (undated), in Andrew Johnson Papers, Reel 45, Manuscript Div., Library
of Congress, Washington, D.C. The letter was likely written between February 2, 1866
(when the bill first passed the Senate) and March 27, 1866 (when President Johnson vetoed
the bill). See CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 606-07, 1679 (1866).
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untaxed Indians, to be citizens of the United States." 8 Trumbull thus
understood the Act's "not subject to any foreign Power" requirement as
equivalent to "child of parents domiciled in the United States."9 The
Fourteenth Amendment instead requires individuals to instead be "subject to
the jurisdiction," which is slightly different wording. However, members of
Congress understood that language to be more precisely describing, not
substantively altering, the set of individuals excluded from birthright
citizenship by the Civil Rights Act.'" Trumbull did not address the issue
expressly in congressional debate, but it appears logical to conclude that he
intended to link "subject to the jurisdiction" to domicile as well.11
In making this connection, Trumbull drew on settled legal understandings.
Domicile had an unambiguous definition in 1866: one acquired domicile in a
nation or a particular place by moving there with the intention of making it
one's permanent residence. 2 In Justice Story's words, domicile is "where [a
person] has his true, fixed, permanent home ... to which, whenever he is
absent, he has the intention of returning"; it is "that place .. .in which [a
person's] habitation is fixed, without any present intention of moving
therefrom."13 Only two prerequisites must be satisfied, Story said, for domicile
to exist: "residence; and.. . intention of making it the home of the [person]";14
he makes no reference to governmental consent to or authority over domicile.
8. Letter from Sen. Lyman Trumbull to President Andrew Johnson, supra note 7. "[U] ntaxed
Indians" refers to "those persons who yet belong to the Indian tribes ... those Indians yet
belonging to a foreign Government, and not counted as a part of our people." CONG. GLOBE,
39 th Cong., ist Sess. 572 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull). Thus, tribal Indians living in
U.S. territory were nonetheless not domiciled in the United States, properly speaking.
9. To the best of my research, this letter's content has never been discussed in legal
scholarship. I was alerted to its existence by references in MARK M. KRUG, LYMAN
TRUMBULL: CONSERVATIVE RADICAL 24o (1965); and John H. & LaWanda Cox, Andrew
Johnson and His Ghost Writers: An Analysis of the Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights Veto
Messages, 48 Miss. VALLEY HIST. REV. 460, 462 (1961), and I subsequently located it in the
Andrew Johnson Papers, supra note 7.
io. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 1st Sess. 2893-94 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull)
(explaining why the Amendment altered the Act's citizenship language, though "[t]he
object to be arrived at is the same").
ii. Such links are not inconsistent with Trumbull's stated views. See id. at S72 (statement of
Sen. Trumbull) (expressing concern about making citizens of"persons temporarily resident
in [the country]").
12. I deal only with domicile as of the letter's drafting in 1866.
13. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CoNFLIcT OF LAWS §§ 41, 43, at 39-40, 42 (Boston,
Hilliard, Gray, and Co., 1834).
14. Id. § 44, at 42.
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Story's view of domicile was subsequently endorsed by the U.S. Supreme
Court,'" federal circuit courts," and state courts. 
7
Several general principles follow from pre-1866 domicile opinions. A
person could change domicile by leaving one jurisdiction and settling in
another, regardless of whether those jurisdictions were states within a country
or separate nations." In certain international contexts (such as neutrality
agreements), acquiring domicile resulted in "a national character [being]
impressed upon a person, different from that which permanent allegiance gives
him"; such a person, though, could easily choose to cast off that "national
character" by returning to his or her native country.9 Domicile and citizenship
were thus distinct from one another,2" and acquiring the former in a new
country did not alter the latter.
To examine whether individuals had acquired domicile, courts conducted a
context-dependent, subjective inquiry into the extent of any evidence
demonstrating the fact and intention of their permanent residence.2' They did
not require a minimum period of residence.' Indeed, if the evidence of a
person's intent to remain permanently in a particular place was sufficiently
strong, he could gain domicile there "by a residence even of a few days." 3
Judges evaluating domicile thus asked two questions. First, is a person
living in a particular place? Second, does the evidence suggest he or she intends
to keep living there indefinitely? If both answers were yes, then the person had
domicile in that place. This link between domicile and territory, rather than
15. See, e.g., Ennis v. Smith, 55 U.S. 400 (1852).
16. See, e.g., Prentiss v. Brennan, 19 F. Cas. 1278 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 11,385); Burnham v.
Rangeley, 4 F. Cas. 773 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 2176).
Ii. See, e.g., Thorndike v. City of Boston, 42 Mass. (1 Met.) 242 (1840) (Shaw, C.J.); In re High,
2 Doug. 515 (Mich. 1847); Hairston v. Hairston, 27 Miss. 704 (1854); Hegeman v. Fox, 31
Barb. 475 (N.Y. App. Div. 186o).
is. See, e.g., Prentiss v. Barton, 19 F. Cas. 1276 (C.C.D. Va. 1819) (No. 11,384) (Marshall, Circuit
Justice) (states); Ringgold v. Barley, 5 Md. 186 (1853) (same); see also, e.g., The Venus, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 253 (1814) (nations); Hood's Estate, 21 Pa. 1o6 (1853) (same).
19. The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 277-78, 280.
20. Cf. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 120 (1804) ("[A]n American
citizen may acquire in a foreign country, the commercial privileges attached to his
domicil[e].").
21. See, e.g., The Ann Green, i F. Cas. 958, 962 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 414) (Story, Circuit
Justice); Hairston, 27 Miss. 704.
22. See, e.g., Town of Reading v. Town of Westport, 19 Conn. 561 (1849).
23. The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) at 279.
119:1351 2010
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DOMICILE
consent, has important implications for contemporary debates over the proper
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Citizenship Clause.
II. THE REVISIONIST INTERPRETATION OF THE CITIZENSHIP CLAUSE
The orthodox understanding of the Citizenship Clause is that it applies to
virtually all children born in the United States, and that "subject to the
jurisdiction" excludes only "children of foreign sovereigns or their ministers
... [and] children of members of the Indian tribes owing direct allegiance to
their several tribes."' Citizenship requires a reciprocal bond of individual
allegiance owed to the sovereign and protection provided by the sovereign.
That bond is created merely by birth within the territory and sovereign
authority of the state.2"
Some scholars have more recently criticized this territorial view for
interpreting "subject to the jurisdiction" more narrowly than the historical
record would justify.26 These revisionist commentators point out that, in
Fourteenth Amendment debates, key Republican legislators argued that, for
citizenship purposes, an individual had to be subject to the "fill and complete
jurisdiction," of the United States, to the "same ...extent and quality as
applies to every citizen," while "[n]ot owing allegiance to anybody else."
27
They read such statements as distinguishing between mere "territorial"
jurisdiction (applicable to everyone) and the more "complete, political
jurisdiction" over an individual that flows from the individual's "allegiance to
the sovereign. '' 8
24. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 693 (1898); see also Societal and Legal Issues
Surrounding Children Born in the United States to Illegal Alien Parents, Hearing on H.R. 705,
H.R. 363, H.J. Res. 56, H.J. Res 64, H.J. Res. 87, H.J. Res 88, and H.J. Res. 93 Before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims and Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. of the
Judiciary, H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 77-82 (1995) (statement of Walter
Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice)
(endorsing Wong Kim Ark's narrow reading of "subject to the jurisdiction").
25. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 570 (1866) (statement of Sen. Morrill)
("[E]very man, by his birth, is entitled to citizenship, and that upon the general principle
that he owes allegiance to the country of his birth, and that country owes him protection.").
26. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 1.
27. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., 1st Sess. 2895 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard); id. at 2893
(statement of Sen. Trumbull). Senator Trumbull, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, drafted the citizenship clause of the Civil Rights Act; Senator Howard was floor
manager of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 2764-65 (statement of Sen. Howard).
28. Eastman, supra note 1, at 1488.
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Allegiance, on this view, requires both birth within the United States and
the additional prior choice by the child's parents2 9 to affiliate themselves with
the United States. This choice involves renouncing their previous allegiance,3"
or at least formally demonstrating "commitment" to the United States by
obtaining permanent resident status and assuming the "contributive
responsibilities" of citizens.31 Further, affiliation must be met with the
"reciprocal consent... of the nation to [the individual's] membership."32
In short, children of undocumented immigrants would not be citizens
because they do not satisfy core elements of the consensualist approach: that
children born in the United States attain birthright citizenship only when born
to parents inside the U.S. political community, with that community's consent.
The basic territorial model, by contrast, rejects the relevance of parental
citizenship status, the political ties between individual and nation, and
governmental consent.
The consensualist understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
used by conservative commentators, 3 think tanks,34 and advocacy groups" to
support and justify efforts to narrow birthright citizenship without a
constitutional amendment. It has formed the basis for proposed legislation to
limit the acquisition of citizenship. s6 Yet this understanding, while based in
29. On the consensualist view, it is the parents' political status when their child is born that
controls the citizenship of the child. See SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note I, at 86; Eastman,
supra note i, at 1486; Mayton, supra note I, at 247; Wood, supra note 1, at 507.
30. Eastman, supra note 1, at 1489-90.
31. Mayton, supra note i, at 246.
32. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 84 (emphasis omitted).
33. See, e.g., Michelle Malkin, What Makes an American?, TOWNHALL.COM, July 4, 2003,
http://townhall.com/colunmists/MichelleMalin/2oo3/o7/o4/what-makes-an-american.
34. See, e.g., Edward Erler, Citizenship, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION 384,
385-86 (Edwin Meese III, David F. Forte & Matthew Spalding eds., 2005).
35. See, e.g., Fed'n for Am. Immigration Reform, Anchor Babies: Part of the Immigration-Related
American Lexicon, http://www.fairus.org/site/News2?page=NewsArtice&id=16535&security
(last visited Feb. 18, 2oo).
36. In the iioth Congress, for example, Representative Nathan Deal (R-GA), with 104
cosponsors, proposed a bill to end birthright citizenship for children of undocumented
immigrants. See Birthright Citizenship Act of 2007, H.R. 1940, 110th Cong. (2007).
Representative Deal reintroduced the bill in the iith Congress, and, as of February 13, 2010,
had ninety cosponsors. See Birthright Citizenship Act of 2009, H.R. 1868, 111th Cong.
(2009). For information on the text and cosponsors of H.R. 194o and H.R. 1868, see
Library of Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov (look in Advanced Search for bills
sponsored by Rep. Deal in the 11oth and iiith Congresses) (last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
Twelve of the sixteen Republican members of the House Judiciary Committee have
cosponsored H.Rt 1868. Compare the cosponsors of H.R. 1868, supra, with the members of
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significant part on statements made by Senator Trumbull, 37 is inconsistent
with Trumbull's actual emphasis on domicile rather than consent as the
determinant of birthright citizenship.
III.THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DOMICILE
Taking domicile to be the birthright citizenship standard disrupts essential
premises of the consensualist approach. First, children born within the
territorial boundaries of the United States are U.S. citizens (or not) based on
their parents' domicile, not citizenship or political status. Thus, children born
here to citizens of foreign nations do not necessarily take their parents'
citizenship; more precisely, such children are not, as a definitional matter, born
"subject to any foreign power," as consensualists contend. This approach tracks
floor statements by Senator Trumbull on citizenship: responding to President
Johnson's veto of the Civil Rights Act, for example, Trumbull said, "Even the
infant child of a foreigner born in this land is a citizen of the United States long
before his father.
38
Using domicile as the benchmark also contradicts the consensualist
argument that "subject to the jurisdiction" refers not to universally applicable
territorial jurisdiction, but a narrower, "political" type.39 To gain domicile in
1866, one had only to have lived within the territory and planned to
permanently remain; one did not need to first transfer one's sovereign
allegiance. Any new "national character" that one took on through acquiring
domicile in a new country was merely "adventitious," and could "be thrown off
at pleasure" by leaving the country without intent to return.4" This is not
exactly lasting political affiliation 4' or allegiance.42
the House Committee on the Judiciary, http://judiciary.house.gov/abou/members.html
(last visited Feb. 18, 2010).
37. E.g., SCHUCK&SMITH, supra note 1, at 79-83.
38. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866); see also id. at 498 (statement of Sen.
Trumbull) ("I understand that under the naturalization laws the children who are born here
of parents who have not been naturalized are citizens.").
39. See, e.g., Eastman, supra note 1, at 1487-88.
40. The Venus, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 253, 28o (1814).
41. William Mayton argues that contemporary lawful permanent resident status is an
appropriate parental prerequisite for the citizenship of children because its level of affiliation
is equivalent to historical domicile. See Mayton, supra note 1, at 252-53. However, the
comparison is ill-judged: unlike the complex and bureaucratized green card process, the
legally unrestricted acquisition of domicile did not require formal procedures or
governmental interaction. Compare, e.g., U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Servs., Green
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Indeed, in the Fourteenth Amendment debates, the explanations of
jurisdiction given by Trumbull and others refer not to allegiance or political
affiliation of individuals, but to the sovereign authority exercised over them. In
explaining why the Amendment would not make tribal Indians citizens en
masse, Trumbull said:
Does the Government of the United States pretend to take jurisdiction
of murders and robberies and other crimes committed by one Indian
upon another? Are they subject to our jurisdiction in any just sense?
They are not subject to our jurisdiction. We do not exercise jurisdiction
over them. It is only those persons who come completely within our
jurisdiction, who are subject to our laws, that we think of making
citizens; and there can be no objection to the proposition that such
persons should be citizens.43
To be sure, if domicile is the appropriate standard, individuals born here
and subject to our laws would not be "subject to the jurisdiction" for
citizenship purposes if their parents were here only temporarily. Using
domicile in this way is thus more restrictive than the pure territorial approach:
it requires parents to have some meaningful ties to the country in which they
are living for children born there to be citizens.' Yet a domiciliary approach,
Card (Permanent Resident), http://www.uscis.gov/greencard (last visited Feb. 18, 2OO),
with Part I, supra.
42. Common law doctrine held that even aliens residing in a country "under the protection of
[its] government... ow[e] a temporary allegiance thereto." Inglis v. Trs. of Sailor's Snug
Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99, 165 (1830) (Story, J., concurring); see also Carlton F.W. Larson,
The Forgotten Constitutional Law of Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L.
REv. 863, 873-94 (2006) (discussing this common law doctrine in the context of treason
prosecutions for violations of temporary obligations of allegiance). Since consensualists
think that children born here to aliens temporarily present are not citizens, their preferred
allegiance must be of a deeper, more permanent character.
43. CONG. GLOBE, 39 th Cong., ist Sess. 2893 (1866); see also id. at 2895 (statement of Sen.
Howard) ("'Jurisdiction,' as here employed, ought to be construed so as to imply a full and
complete jurisdiction on the part of the United States .... Gentlemen cannot contend that
an Indian belonging to a tribe, although born within the limits of a State, is subject to this
full and complete jurisdiction.... The United States courts have no power to punish an
Indian who is connected with a tribe for a crime committed by him upon another member
of the same tribe.... Why? Because the jurisdiction of the nation intervenes and ousts what
would otherwise be perhaps a right of jurisdiction of the United States.").
44. Such a limitation may have responded to the concern that an unlimited territorial approach
would make citizens completely by happenstance. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Rep. Wilson) ("[E]very person born in the United States is a
natural-born citizen of such States, except [perhaps] ...children born on our soil to
temporary sojourners or representatives of foreign Governments .... "); see also id. at 2769
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even with these limitations, is still different in kind from the consensualist
requirement of "political jurisdiction."
That is, as described in Part I, domicile requires individuals to integrate
themselves into a nation's social fabric through residence such that they
consider it their home and have no plans to leave. Rather than reject the
territorial approach's concern with where individuals are living when the child
is born, domicile creates a somewhat more restrictive definition of "living" for
citizenship purposes. Consensualism, on the other hand, calls for mutual ties
between an individual and the political, rather than the social community of a
country. Beyond residence, it requires that an individual seek, and the country
accept, affiliation between the individual and the government of the country.
Consensualists argue that for birthright citizenship to exist, the
government must have "consented to the individual's presence and status and
offered him complete protection," and that this consent, extended to the
individual's children born here, makes them birthright citizens.4" Yet as of
1866, the requirements for domicile were solely residence and the intention
that it be permanent.46 Domicile was neither mediated nor restricted by state or
federal law47 and could arise irrespective of governmental consent. 4s In short,
to use domicile as the determinant of birthright citizenship is to reject the set of
political concerns that are at the heart of the consensualist view.
This is a particular problem for the consensualist stance on this question:
its heavy use of Trumbull's statements in congressional debate is predicated
(statement of Sen. Fessenden) ("Suppose a person is born here of parents from abroad
temporarily in this country.").
45. SCHUCK & SMITH, supra note 1, at 86.
46. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text.
47. An examination of state high court decisions up to 1866 turned up no references, with one
exception, to statutes defining the acquisition or characteristics of domicile. A Louisiana law
defined the location of domicile within the state once acquired and governed the intrastate
change of domicile. See A. Wesson & Co. v. Marshall, 13 La. Ann. 436 (1858); Cole v. Lucas,
2 La. Ann. 946, 948-50 (1847). In Louisiana, acquisition of domicile by someone moving
into the state, however, was governed by the same combination of fact and intention of
permanent residence used elsewhere. See Cole, 2 La. Ann. at 948-50. As best as can be
determined, no federal statutes relate to domicile in any way.
48. Peter Schuck believes that Trumbull and others would reject the idea that one could acquire
domicile through the commission of illicit acts such as fraud, or, more recently, unlawful
presence. Email from Peter Schuck, Simeon E. Baldwin Professor of Law, Yale Law Sch., to
Mark Shawhan (Oct. 30, 2009, 11:12 EDT) (on file with author). Pre-1866 courts and
commentators seem not to have considered this issue, much less come to definite
conclusions.
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upon him accepting, not repudiating, consensualist principles. 49 It is not
impossible to make a historically based consensualist argument regarding
citizenship without citing Trumbull for evidence; at the very least, however, it
is substantially more difficult.
This analysis is not meant to be the final word on the subject. More work
remains to be done here, particularly in examining whether other legislators
shared Trumbull's interpretation of the Civil Rights Act's citizenship language,
and what implications would follow if they did.50 This Comment has rather
focused on a serious, and heretofore unrecognized, weakness in consensualist
arguments about the proper understanding of "citizen of the United States."s"
MARK SHAWHAN
49. Nor is there any indication in the 1866 Civil Rights Act and Fourteenth Amendment debates
that other senators (incorrectly) understood Trumbull as making consensualist arguments.
On the contrary, crucial legislators such as Senator Howard saw Trumbull as equating
jurisdiction with sovereign authority, not political membership. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th
Cong., ist Sess. 2895 (1866).
so. One difficult question, for example, would be what standard to apply to citizenship
determinations. One could, for example, simply use contemporary domicile standards.
While straightforward, this approach could have the anomalous and troubling effect of
precluding those children who are born here to parents present for a substantial, but legally
bounded, period on student or employment visas from claiming birthright citizenship. My
thanks to Akhil Amar for this point. Substituting equivalent criteria such as an individual's
length of time in the United States, or the extent of their social integration here, could be
more nuanced and flexible, but at the expense of significant evidentiary costs.
51. CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., 1st Sess. 1117 (1866) (statement of Sen. Trumbull).
136o
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